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The Rapid Support Forces’ siege of Dalang — which had left the Kordofan city’s residents suffering a severe humanitarian crisis for the last two years that has been exacerbated by military mismanagement of access to essential goods and weeks of sustained shelling — was lifted this week.
The military broke into the city on Monday after heavy fighting with the RSF and their ally, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) led by Abdel Aziz al-Hilu, in the Habila area east of the city.
While the move carries implications for humanitarian access to a city which is estimated to be suffering under famine conditions, it also allowed the military, after weeks of attempts, to open a major supply route into Kordofan. A logistical corridor now runs from Port Sudan through White Nile State and North Kordofan to South Kordofan’s Dalang and Kadugli, paving the way for major military operations in southern and western Kordofan, a senior military officer told Mada Masr.
The RSF and SPLM-N featured in talks held on Sunday in Port Sudan between Egypt’s intelligence chief Hassan Mahmoud Rashad and Transitional Sovereignty Council Chair Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, joined by Sudanese intelligence chief Ahmed Ibrahim Mufaddal.
According to an informed Sudanese source, discussions centered on the two allies’ “sustained activity” along the Ethiopia-Sudan-South Sudan border, in what the source described as an attempt to seize control of the tri-border area.
A security source said RSF units had been assembling in East Darfur before moving through South Sudan and re-entering Sudan, where they linked with RSF and SPLM-N forces coming from Ethiopia in SPLM-N camps in southern Blue Nile State.
RSF forces advancing from these camps launched a surprise attack on Sunday on areas in Bau locality, briefly taking control before withdrawing under military counterattacks.
Security talks were also on the agenda in Port Sudan on Monday, as senior Sudanese officials, including Burhan, Mufaddal and Foreign Minister Mohie Eddin Salem, met a high-level British delegation led by British Defense Ministry senior advisor Edward Ahlgren. Discussions also addressed ways to advance ceasefire efforts, an informed TSC source said.
The ceasefire track has been revived by Washington and Riyadh after months of deadlock. Since mid-January, the United States and Saudi Arabia have circulated a humanitarian truce proposal among regional and UN actors, three diplomatic sources at the Sudanese Foreign Ministry told Mada Masr.
According to a TSC source, the initiative seeks a “functional de-escalation” rather than a full ceasefire, proposing a temporary freeze in lines of control to enable humanitarian operations.
But the proposal would allow RSF-affiliated civil administrations in areas under its control to remain in place — a provision that the source said treats current military and administrative realities as a fait accompli. This has triggered reservations within the government and the military bloc, which an informed Egyptian official previously told Mada Masr has continued to press Burhan on the complete elimination of the RSF, as he has rejected one ceasefire proposal after another.
As regional and international actors scramble to contain the war’s spillover and revive stalled ceasefire efforts, Burhan’s diplomacy has focused on consolidating wartime governance and reinforcing claims of state legitimacy.
Within this calculus, Burhan traveled to Doha on Tuesday, accompanied by Finance Minister Gibril Ibrahim and Central Bank Governor Amna Mirghany, where he met Qatar’s Crown Prince Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani. Diplomatic sources told Mada Masr ahead of the visit that talks were expected to focus on securing direct financing and investment facilities to help restart state institutions, fund reconstruction projects and stabilize the currency.
A former advisor to the government said this economic outreach is inseparable from the logic of managing the war and the leadership’s narrative of “restoring the state.” The economy, the source argued, has become one of the war’s decisive arenas, shaping both the government’s ability to administer areas under its control to prevent social and security collapse, and the military’s capacity to sustain operations, particularly in logistically demanding regions such as Kordofan.
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Riyadh, Washington circulate humanitarian truce proposal, Khartoum signals rejection
US President Donald Trump and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman meet for bilateral talks in Washington DC, November 2025. Courtesy of the White House on X
Since mid-January, the United States and Saudi Arabia have moved to revive efforts toward a humanitarian truce in Sudan, circulating a proposal among regional and UN actors, three diplomatic sources at the Sudanese Foreign Ministry told Mada Masr.
But the initiative — presented after months of deadlock and a string of rejected ceasefire proposals — has already run into resistance in Sudan.
The diplomatic sources said that the iteration indicates Washington and Riyadh have reassessed the 2023 Jeddah platform, which has remained central to the military’s public position since the breakdown of earlier ceasefire attempts, producing a revised proposal aimed at stabilizing frontlines long enough to allow humanitarian access at scale, conditioned on the withdrawal of RSF forces from urban centers.
In its current form, the US-Saudi initiative seeks what a TSC source described as a “functional de-escalation” rather than a comprehensive ceasefire: a temporary freeze in lines of control that would allow humanitarian operations to proceed. During the first week, the UN would oversee the creation of safe corridors and coordinate aid entry, according to the source.
But the proposal allows the civil administrations set up by the RSF in territories under its control to remain in place — an arrangement presented as transitional, designed to facilitate humanitarian work and avoid an administrative vacuum, according to one of the diplomatic sources.
An Egyptian source close to Cairo’s decision-making circles on Sudan told Mada Masr that the initiative, which they described as a set of ideas still under discussion, proposes a six-month freeze, during which both sides would stop attempts to expand their military presence, while external backers would refrain from inciting either side to initiate combat.
The renewed push is the first since Burhan rejected the latest US-led Quad proposal in November, shortly after Saudi Crown Prince Mohamed bin Salman urged US President Donald Trump to intervene on Sudan during a visit to Washington, and following weeks of regional moves by Egypt and Turkey, among other actors, to shore up the military on the ground after the fall of Fasher.
Buoyed by those shifts, and in a bid to create parallel tracks to dodge any binding agreement that might restrict his options, Burhan doubled down on the 2023 Jeddah agreement as the sole framework for any truce, reiterating its prerequisites: the RSF’s disarmament, its withdrawal from all areas seized after the Jeddah talks and the relocation of its fighters to designated military camps.
At least one of those conditions appears partially formalized in the new proposal: the withdrawal of RSF forces from cities and densely populated areas.
The matter had been an informal point of discussion in the weeks after the latest Quad proposal was made. An informed Egyptian official previously told Mada Masr that Burhan had insisted on RSF withdrawal from the centers of major cities due to pressure from the Sudanese military establishment, which is determined to see the RSF eliminated, “so he could at least go back to those he represents to tell them, ‘this is the beginning of the RSF’s withdrawal.’” The RSF, the source added at the time, is unlikely to accept such terms, and even compliance would not fundamentally change the fact that there is a de facto division in Sudan.
The demand for an RSF withdrawal has underpinned the military’s rejection of any truce leaving RSF forces inside captured cities.
The TSC source said that the proposal, by allowing RSF-affiliated civil administrations to remain, treats existing military and administrative arrangements as a fait accompli, triggering widespread reservations within the government, the military and allied armed coalitions, particularly the Darfuri armed movements.
Darfur regional governor and leader of the military-allied Sudan Liberation Movement, Minni Arko Minnawi, has expressed a strongly dismissive stance toward the proposed truce in its current form, arguing that the withdrawal of RSF forces from cities cannot be symbolic or partial, according to a source close to him.
Minnawi insists that any truce that does not include the disarmament of heavy weapons and the dismantling of the RSF’s military structure would effectively reproduce armed control through civilian instruments, entrenching a prolonged administrative and political division, particularly in Darfur.
Those positions were echoed in an article published Saturday by Burhan in the Turkish journal Almanac Diplomatique. “The essence of our conditions has not changed [since the 2023 Jeddah talks]: withdrawal from occupied areas, the removal of heavy weapons from the equation and the termination of any separate power center operating outside the state’s chain of command,” Burhan wrote. “Our aim is not to ‘manage’ the conflict, but to return Sudan to the line of an institutional state.”
According to a military source close to Burhan, the article was intended as a message in several directions. Internationally, it sought to reframe the war away from narratives of “civil war” or “balanced parties,” and toward questions of statehood, sovereignty and institutional unity.
On the other hand, the source said, it directly reflects the state’s reservations about the US-Saudi initiative — particularly the retention of RSF-affiliated civil administrations — “which Burhan views as a strategic danger no less serious than direct military threat.”
Following bin Salman’s visit to Washington in November, another Egyptian source familiar with Cairo’s policy on Sudan previously told Mada Masr that Egypt has accepted Riyadh’s leadership on the Sudan file “because this is the only way it could work.”
“For the Saudis, the question of Sudan is different from what it is for Egypt,” the Egyptian source close to Cairo’s decision-making circles on Sudan said. Riyadh sees Sudan through the lens of Red Sea security, an arena where it is pushing against Emirati influence in the region, while for Cairo, Sudan is a strategic national security issue, the source said.
“It is a very difficult situation now because neither Burhan could win, nor the RSF could be defeated,” the source added. “Having pulled out of Yemen, the Emiratis are increasing their presence in Sudan,” sending the RSF weapons, mercenaries and intelligence personnel and providing funding.
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Senior British delegation holds high-level talks in Port Sudan
Transitional Sovereignty Council Chair Abdel Fattah al-Burhan meets with British delegation in Port Sudan, January 26. Courtesy of the TSC on X
A high-level British delegation arrived in Port Sudan on Monday for talks with Sudanese officials, led by British Defense Ministry Senior Advisor for the Middle East and North Africa Edward Ahlgren, alongside the UK’s Special Representative to Sudan Richard Crowder and Britain’s military attache in Cairo.
An informed source in the Transitional Sovereignty Council said the British delegation held a series of meetings with military leaders and government officials to discuss recent security developments and ways to advance ceasefire efforts, amid what a Sudanese Foreign Ministry source described as British moves to engage in initiatives aimed at halting the fighting and addressing Sudan’s humanitarian and political crisis.
In a statement issued on Tuesday, Sudan’s government said the British delegation met with Burhan, Mufaddal and Salem, “in the context of strengthening political and security consultation between the two countries.”
Discussions with Burhan also focused on mechanisms to improve humanitarian access to affected areas, the informed TSC source said.
A Sudanese government delegation, including representatives from the defense and foreign ministries, took part in the bilateral talks, “reaffirming the government’s openness to initiatives that meet the aspirations of the Sudanese people and respect the state’s sovereignty and territorial integrity,” according to the statement.
The two sides also discussed “practical steps toward normalizing bilateral relations.”
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Egyptian intelligence chief in Port Sudan for border security talks; RSF forces transit through South Sudan
General Intelligence Services head Hassan Mahmoud Rashad holds talks with Burhan in Port Sudan, January 25. Courtesy of the TSC on Telegram
General Intelligence Services head Hassan Mahmoud Rashad arrived in Port Sudan on Sunday for talks with his counterpart Mufaddal and Burhan.
The discussions centered on regional security concerns amid growing worries about the war’s spillover effects on Sudan’s borders, an informed Sudanese source and the Egyptian source close to Cairo’s decision-making circles on Sudan told Mada Masr.
The Egyptian source said the visit aimed to discuss the nature of intelligence sharing, as well as coordination on Burhan’s ongoing diplomatic tour.
The talks also covered the future of negotiations and developments around the Washington-Riyadh initiative, the Sudanese source said.
During the talks, Burhan, Rashad and Mufaddal reviewed “sustained activity” by the RSF and the SPLM-N (Hilu), along the Ethiopia-Sudan-South Sudan border, in what the source described as an attempt to seize control of the tri-border area.
A South Sudanese Foreign Ministry official told Mada Masr that Juba rejects any use of its territory for joint RSF-SPLM-N operations against Sudan and is coordinating with Khartoum to prevent such activity.
A Sudanese security source told Mada Masr that RSF units had been detected assembling in the Regeibat area near Daein in East Darfur over the past two weeks, from where they entered South Sudan’s Aweil region, continued to Juba and then flew to Renk, before re-entering Sudan and joining SPLM-N (Hilu) camps in the far south and southwest of Blue Nile. Additional RSF-SPLM-N troops previously spotted inside Ethiopian territory were also observed to have joined these camps.
On Sunday, RSF forces advancing from the SPLM-N (Hilu) camps launched a surprise attack on the Sillik and Milkan areas in the Bau locality, briefly taking control of both before withdrawing under military counterattacks, a field source told Mada Masr.
The military’s Fourth Infantry Division in Blue Nile’s capital Damazin, 150 km from Bau, said it regained control of the Sillik after several hours of fighting.
The field source said RSF units pulled back toward SPLM-N (Hilu) camps, including in Ulu and Foug in the southwest of Blue Nile. The area has since seen increased military drone and air force activity.
On Friday and Saturday, the military carried out airstrikes in the Yabus area in the far south near the Ethiopian border, as RSF and SPLM-N forces, led by commander Joseph Tuka, mobilized large numbers of fighters in preparation for operations on the Blue Nile front, according to the source.
TSC Deputy Chair Malik Agar meets with South Sudanese President Salva Kiir in Juba, January 25. Courtesy of the TSC on X
TSC Deputy Chair Malik Agar met in Juba with National Security Adviser Tut Gatluak and President Salva Kiir on Sunday, to discuss the border situation and measures to push RSF forces away from border areas, according to a source in the South Sudanese Foreign Ministry.
Both Gatluak and Kiir outlined the scale of security challenges facing Juba in these areas, where splinter armed factions are active and government forces lack full control.
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Burhan in Doha
Burhan and Qatari Crown Prince Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani meet for bilateral talks in Doha, January 27. Courtesy of the TSC on X
Burhan held bilateral talks in the Qatari capital Doha with the crown prince of Qatar on Tuesday, a visit a former Sudanese Foreign Ministry official previously told Mada Masr has been awaited to close a tightly sequenced regional tour that took Burhan to Riyadh, Cairo and Ankara in December.
According to diplomatic and government sources speaking to Mada Masr before the talks, the Doha talks align with the same strategic calculus guiding Burhan’s December outreach: an attempt to restore the military-led state’s legitimacy at home and abroad while sustaining military operations, this time by securing direct financial support from one of Sudan’s key economic backers.
Burhan was accompanied by Finance Minister Gibril Ibrahim and Central Bank of Sudan Governor Amna Mirghany aboard a Turkish-registered private jet that flew from Istanbul to Port Sudan before heading to Doha — a sign of Turkey’s increasing role that Burhan spelled out explicitly in comments to the press this week.
According to a source at the prime minister’s office and three diplomatic sources, the composition of the delegation underscores the visit’s economic focus. Talks were expected to center on securing direct financing, as well as financial and investment facilities, to help restart state institutions, enable the government’s gradual return to Khartoum, fund reconstruction projects and stabilize the currency and banking sector, the sources said.
One of the three diplomatic sources described the visit as part of the government’s broader bet on regional partners to help bridge the financing gap. With domestic resources severely constrained, moving from crisis management to a recovery track remains difficult without external economic backing commensurate with the accumulated challenges imposed by the war, they said.
A former advisor to the government said that Burhan’s economic push cannot be separated from the logic of managing the war, nor from the leadership’s narrative of “restoring the state.” According to the source, the economy has emerged as one of the war’s decisive arenas, shaping both the military’s ability to sustain operations and the government’s capacity to administer areas under its control and prevent social and security collapse.
From a war effort perspective, the former advisor explained, military leadership requires stable financial resources to cover salaries, supplies, fuel, ammunition and maintenance — costs that have become increasingly burdensome amid collapsing public revenues, economic contraction and the erosion of the currency’s value. Such a major economic disruption, they noted, is directly reflected in the military’s fighting capacity, limiting its ability to open new fronts or accelerate operations, particularly in complex battlegrounds such as Kordofan, where sustained deployments, secure supply lines and high logistical costs are required. For this reason, reactivating the economy — even partially — and securing external support are viewed as prerequisites for sustaining military operations, rather than as a separate civilian file, the source said.
Burhan is also aware that military control alone is insufficient to guarantee stability in areas under government authority, the former advisor added. Experience over the past two years has shown that the absence of services, delays in salary payments and rising prices can turn any “liberated” area into a security and political liability, fueling social discontent that can be exploited against the ruling authorities.
Addressing the economic crisis thus becomes a tool for managing the post-control phase. Restoring a minimum level of services, stabilizing markets, ensuring the availability of basic commodities and paying public sector wages grants the government a measure of practical legitimacy in the eyes of local populations, the source said.
Beyond the domestic front, Burhan is also seeking to signal to external actors that his government is not just managing a war, but has a vision for governing the state, according to the former advisor.
Securing economic or financial backing from regional actors, they noted, hinges on the government’s ability to present itself as an authority capable of maintaining order in areas under its control, rather than as a party mired in an open-ended war. “Such support is not used solely for reconstruction or service delivery,” the former advisor said, explaining that “it also provides financial flexibility that eases pressure on the military budget and gives the leadership a wider margin for maneuver.”
In Burhan’s calculations, addressing the economic crisis is not a purely humanitarian or reformist objective, the source concluded. Rather, it is part of a comprehensive strategy that links war financing, accelerating military control in Kordofan, ensuring stability in government-held areas and preventing the fragmentation of the internal front. The economy, in this sense, has shifted from a deferred file to a dual-purpose instrument of war and governance — used simultaneously to strengthen the military position, improve the capacity to rule and buy time in a long and open-ended conflict.
Within that strategy, “Kordofan represents an economic bottleneck as much as it is a military one,” a government source in North Kordofan State told Mada Masr. “It is a pivotal region for agricultural and livestock production and controls internal trade routes linking western Sudan with the center and the east. Accelerating control over it is not only aimed at weakening a military adversary, but at reclaiming potential resources that could be used to finance both the state and the war.” Exploiting these resources, the source added, requires a minimum level of economic and administrative stability, which is impossible to achieve amid total financial collapse.
As for reconstruction, the government has yet to present a publicly announced comprehensive and detailed plan. But the source at the prime minister’s office said officials are advancing a phased approach.
The first phase centers on what is known as the emergency budget, designed to preserve a minimum level of essential services and restart vital facilities in relatively secure areas. Spending under this framework is tightly restricted to urgent priorities, with the budget reviewed and updated on a quarterly basis.
The second phase, the source added, focuses on reviving productive sectors, chiefly agriculture and related industries, seen as the fastest pathway to restoring economic activity and creating jobs. This approach relies heavily on mobilizing external financing and investment, whether from allied states or regional and international institutions, to fund reconstruction efforts that exceed the capacity of domestic resources. This would be coupled with incentives for the private sector, including tax exemptions, eased import procedures for equipment and reduced energy costs.
Within this framework, the source said, Burhan’s visit to Doha represents a bid to mobilize economic and financial support to sustain the emergency budget and enable the government to move forward with arrangements for a return to Khartoum.
Economist Haitham Mohamed Fathi told Mada Masr that the war’s direct and indirect losses have exceeded tens of billions of dollars, with thousands of factories and commercial facilities destroyed or forced to shut down. Key sectors such as manufacturing, transport and financial services have effectively collapsed. The state has lost a substantial share of its sovereign revenues — from taxes, customs duties and exports — at a time when military and humanitarian spending has risen to unprecedented levels, he said.
Agriculture, the backbone of Sudan’s economy, has also been hit hard, Fathi noted. Major production areas have fallen outside secure zones, supply chains have been disrupted, input costs have risen sharply and large numbers of agricultural workers have been displaced.
As for the industrial sector, economist Abdel Azim al-Mahl told Mada Masr that it has come close to a standstill in Khartoum and other industrial centers. Exports — particularly gold and livestock, among the state’s main sources of hard currency — have been hit by weak control over production areas and border crossings.
Inflation, Mahl argued, remains one of the clearest indicators of the crisis’s depth. While rates previously exceeded 200 percent, a source at the Finance Ministry said inflation has eased somewhat in recent months, currently estimated at around 60 to 70 percent on an annual basis. Even at these levels, Mahl noted, price pressures remain severe. The result has been a sustained erosion of purchasing power, accompanied by rising poverty and food insecurity.
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Military lifts 2-year siege of Dalang, South Kordofan
Civilians gather and celebrate as military vehicles pass through the crowd in Dalang, South Kordofan, published on January 28. Courtesy of military-aligned Telegram channel @sport6780
After weeks of attempts to advance toward the besieged city, the military broke into Dalang on Monday, ending a siege that had lasted for over two years. The breakthrough followed heavy fighting with the RSF and their ally the SPLM-N (Hilu), in the Habila area east of the city.
A senior military officer told Mada Masr that the military and allied forces had, over the past several weeks, opened up multiple fronts across Kordofan to divert the RSF’s attention and thin its ranks, including the Hammadi front along the Dalang-Kadugli main road. These operations, the officer said, set the stage for this week’s advance, during which RSF and SPLM-N (Hilu) forces were defeated in Habila, allowing the eastern route into Dalang to be opened.
According to the officer, the military advanced on Habila along several axes with support from drones, dismantling more than 15 RSF positions en-route and foiling several ambushes. Before storming Dalang, the military established control over Habila, Kartala and Katima.
Entry into Dalang has reopened supply routes for both civilians and the military, the source said. A military logistical supply line has now been secured, extending from Port Sudan in eastern Sudan, through White Nile State, North Kordofan’s Obeid, South Kordofan’s Abu Gebeiha, down to Dalang and Kadugli. This development, the officer said, paves the way for major military operations in southern and western Kordofan.
Civilians in both Dalang and the state capital Kadugli have been subjected to weeks of artillery and drone attacks as the RSF and SPLM-N (Hilu) attempted to take over the cities. Supply routes have been repeatedly cut since the allies imposed a blockade in October 2023, pushing both cities to the brink. Conditions deteriorated sharply by the end of June 2025, when the Kadugli-Dalang road was sealed, cutting off all supply chains. In November, the global authority on food security declared famine in Kadugli. Conditions in Dalang were believed to be similarly dire, but a lack of data prevented a classification.
On Tuesday, a day after the siege was lifted, the RSF shelled Dalang using drones, injuring several civilians, a field source in the military-allied armed movements told Mada Masr. The group also attempted to advance again and retake the Habila area, engaging in heavy fighting, but the military repelled the assault, the source said. The military and the joint force killed dozens of RSF fighters and destroyed more than 15 combat vehicles during the thwarted operation, forcing the remaining forces to flee toward Abu Zabad and SPLM-N-controlled areas in South Kordofan.
The military has since deployed additional troops to Dalang and reinforced advanced defensive positions in the Habila area as part of a broader plan to secure the region and pursue remaining RSF elements.
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