Islamic State’s Attack in Kabul Against Chinese Nationals

Executive Summary

The Islamic State terrorist attack at a Chinese restaurant in Kabul confirms the Taliban’s inability to control the territory and undermines the Chinese economic interests in the country.

This report highlights that Beijing must confront the threats that terrorist organisations, including the Islamic State, present to its economic interests within Afghanistan and guard against the possibility of jihadist propaganda inciting Uyghur militants to conduct violent attacks within Chinese territory, particularly in Xinjiang.

The investigation highlights that the Taliban must prioritise national security and counter-terrorism efforts. This is crucial to avoid damaging their reputation and facing economic consequences, which could arise from a loss of confidence among international companies and foreign investors. Such a loss would directly result from increasing geopolitical instability, made worse by violent incidents.

Key Takeaways

1. The Islamic State terrorist attack in Kabul confirms the group’s ability to threaten security in Afghanistan.
2. Targeting Chinese nationals and promoting jihadist propaganda in favour of the Uyghur Muslims threaten Beijing’s interests in Afghanistan and stability in Xinjiang.
3. The recent violent incident in Afghanistan’s capital underscores the Taliban’s deficiencies in territorial governance and jeopardises Kabul’s strategy for securing foreign investment in national economic development.

Background Information

On Monday, January 19, 2026, an Islamic State suicide bomber targeted a Chinese restaurant in Kabul, killing at least seven people (one Chinese national) and wounding more than a dozen others. Following the attack, the Islamic State’s Amaq News Agency released a statement claiming responsibility for the blast and citing China’s treatment of Uyghur Muslims as the motivation for targeting its citizens.

According to a communication disseminated across its media outlets, the Islamic State reported that one of its operatives, identified as Uthman al-Muwahhid, detonated himself within a “hotel catering to Chinese nationals in the Shahr-e-Naw district” of Kabul. According to the terrorist group, this action resulted in approximately “25 fatalities and injuries, including members of the Taliban.”

It is not unprecedented for the Islamic State to target Chinese nationals and Beijing’s interests in Afghanistan. In December 2022, the Islamic State Wilayat Khorasan (ISKP) claimed an attack at the Kabul Longan Hotel, resulting in three civilian deaths and 18 injuries, including foreign nationals.

Geopolitical Scenario

Afghanistan is in the middle of a new geopolitical game involving different regional and international actors. In July 2025, the Russian Federation officially recognised the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan and the Taliban government, opening a new phase in the regional geopolitical game.

In August 2025, during the 6^th China-Afghanistan-Pakistan Trilateral Foreign Ministers’ Dialogue, the parties discussed Afghanistan’s inclusion in the Belt and Road Initiative project. This Chinese initiative sought to optimise the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, ensuring Beijing direct maritime trade access by connecting its territory to the ports of Karachi or Gwadar via Afghanistan and Pakistan.

In September 2025, through X, US President Donald Trump proposed the idea of the United States returning to Bagram Air Base, a facility strategically important in Afghanistan because of its location.

On October 10, 2025, Indian External Affairs Minister Dr S. Jaishankar and Afghan Foreign Minister Mawlawi Amir Khan Muttaqi met in New Delhi to strengthen bilateral ties through expanded development projects in healthcare, infrastructure, and the launch of a new Air Freight Corridor. The parties unequivocally condemned regional terrorism and reaffirmed India and Afghanistan’s commitment to mutual security, with India pledging continued humanitarian aid and disaster relief, and Afghanistan inviting Indian investment in its mining and energy sectors.

The meeting preceded the military hostilities between Afghanistan and Pakistan, which resulted in border clashes and elevated regional tensions between the two neighbouring nations. In October and November 2025, Kabul faced military action and pressure from Islamabad because of accusations of sheltering Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) militants. This situation raised concerns among regional players about a potential conflict spillover that could destabilise the entire area.

Security Scenario

Since the US troops’ withdrawal from the country and the Taliban’s rise to power in Kabul in August 2021, the ISKP has posed a significant challenge to the country’s stability.

Reports from the UN and assessments by foreign experts have consistently revealed the existence of multiple terrorist groups operating within Afghanistan. In August 2025, Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu reported approximately twenty international organisations operating within Afghanistan, alongside about twenty-three thousand combatants in the country.

Beyond al-Qaeda, a terrorist group with whom the Taliban has historically maintained relationships, the ISKP has risen as a significant geopolitical player, influencing the nation’s security, the government’s standing, and the interest of foreign investors in local ventures and the market.

The terrorist threat extends beyond Afghanistan’s borders, as evidenced by the December 2025 attack on Chinese workers in Tajikistan. Over ten individuals, comprising Chinese nationals, have perished because of recent armed incursions along the 1,340km border between Tajikistan and Afghanistan, consequently placing considerable strain on the delicate accord between Dushanbe and the Taliban’s governing body.

Conclusion

The ISPK’s deliberate focus on Chinese nationals and their common gathering places unequivocally shows their intention to challenge the Chinese presence in Afghanistan. The Islamic State’s backing of the Uyghurs because of Beijing’s policies concerning this Muslim ethnic minority serve as additional indicators of the terrorist organisation’s future strategic aims.

Assessing the jihadist propaganda disseminated via al-Naba’s forthcoming publication and scrutinising ISKP’s media outlets are imperative for determining any potential escalation of this terrorist group’s confrontation with Beijing through an increased frequency of attacks against Chinese nationals, or conversely, if this event represents a singular incident.

The Taliban administration must furnish assurances to Beijing regarding the safety of Chinese nationals if Kabul seeks to sustain the influx of financial aid and investment. Despite the Taliban’s frequent assertions of success in combating terrorism, disseminated through official media and social networks regarding their counterterrorism operations against the Islamic State, instances of violent attacks and reports from international organisations have substantiated a deteriorating national security and stability situation.

Considering Russia’s growing interest in Afghan operations through investment and business, looking at the Chinese experience with ISKP terrorism, it is imperative for Moscow to recognise the potential exposure of its nationals and enterprises to violent incidents, owing to the substantial number of Central Asian militants in the ISKP.

The current geopolitical situation involving Afghanistan and the surrounding Central Asian republics has advanced to a point where we can consider terrorist groups as geopolitical entities capable of seriously affecting local administration and investment potential.

Disclaimer: The images of Islamic State propaganda included in this article are used strictly as evidentiary sources to support the report’s findings. SpecialEurasia and the author do not endorse any activities, ideologies, or narratives promoted by the Islamic State.