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While African Union officials see Sudan’s return to the African Union as unlikely in the near term as Prime Minister Kamel Idris presses to make the case for reinstatement, his diplomacy, aided by Djiboutian mediation has produced a procedural step toward re-engagement with continental blocs.
The Sudanese military-led Security and Defense Council gave preliminary approval on Wednesday for Sudan to rejoin the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), from which Sudan withdrew two years ago. The bloc had issued a statement in late January calling on Sudan to return, following Idris’s meeting with IGAD Executive Secretary Workneh Gebeyehu in talks mediated by Djibouti, which played a central role in persuading Idris of re-engaging, a source in the Transitional Sovereignty Council told Mada Masr.
But Idris’s visit to Djibouti last week to test African positions on Sudan’s return to the AU was far less decisive. Former government sources described the talks with Djiboutian President Ismail Omar Guelleh as ambiguous, yielding neither clear timelines nor definitive answers.
Idris — appointed last year partly in a bid to meet the AU’s civilian-led governance benchmarks — has long approached the reinstatement of Sudan’s AU membership as a test of his ability to assert himself, a former ministerial source said. But for the prime minister, delays by political forces in forming the transitional legislative council have undercut his attempt to demonstrate that Sudan is institutionally ready for reinstatement, according to an informed ministerial source.
Idris’s push has run into the same internal dynamics that have fueled TSC Chair Abdel Fattah al-Burhan’s anger toward his political allies’ performance, particularly as opposition forces step up their outreach to argue against Sudan’s return to the AU absent a comprehensive political settlement, according to a former advisor in the government of former Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok, who leads the opposition Sumud alliance.
But AU officials told Mada Masr that establishing transitional institutions alone is not enough for reinstatement, as long as the war continues without a credible roadmap for ending it. An official in the AU Commission said that a humanitarian truce, such as those advanced through the United States-led Quad initiatives, could help create conditions for Sudan’s gradual reintegration if it establishes consensus around a ceasefire and a political framework.
Three months after the last Quad truce proposal — which Sudan’s government and military rejected outright — US Senior Advisor on Arab and Middle Eastern Affairs Massad Boulos said on Tuesday that a new draft has been prepared following consultations with the warring parties, the Quad, the United Nations and other partners. The plan includes limited withdrawals to allow humanitarian aid delivery. Boulos noted that the proposal is still being finalized and has not yet been presented to either side. Two Sudanese officials told Mada Masr that it is too early to talk about draft texts, stressing that any plan failing to reflect the government and military’s 2023 Jeddah Agreement-anchored conditions — which have been thrown up against every proposal since November — would amount to little more than “discussion points.”
With no breakthrough in sight, the military has expanded on last week’s advance in South Kordofan’s Dalang, lifting on Tuesday the Rapid Support Forces and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement–North’s two-year siege on Kadugli and reopening the main road linking the two cities. A former military officer said that forces across South Kordofan can now link up, push into West Kordofan and isolate SPLM-N strongholds in the far southeast.
On the same day that the military announced the lifting of the siege, the RSF and SPLM-N drones struck the city. According to Sudan’s Doctors Network, 15 civilians were killed and 11 were injured.
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Govt moves on AU reinstatement bid, AU officials: Unlikely without a ceasefire framework in place
Prime Minister Kamel Idris is handed a Djiboutian product during his visit to the Doraleh Multipurpose Port with Djibouti’s foreign minister, January 28. Courtesy of the Djibouti Ports Authority on X.
With the AU’s next ordinary session approaching, Sudan’s government is mounting a renewed push to have its suspension from the continental body lifted, betting on diplomacy and procedural steps to press its case and grant it renewed legitimacy as talks over a ceasefire with the RSF have stalled. AU officials, however, told Mada Masr that absent a ceasefire and an inclusive political track, Sudan’s return remains off the table.
The Sudanese government’s efforts have played out at two levels. At the regional level, Prime Minister Kamel Idris has led a diplomatic offensive to sway AU member states to support Sudan’s bid for reinstatement. And at the domestic level, Burhan and Idris have tried to push for the formation of a transitional legislative council, which they see as a key institutional benchmark in meeting AU democracy requirements.
This push, however, cannot be separated from ongoing ceasefire talks.
Since the fall of Fasher, a key setback for the military and its allies in the broad anti-RSF coalition, Burhan has worked to engage parallel political tracks that avoid locking him into any binding ceasefire framework at the intentional level. A return to the AU could provide Khartoum with added leverage and help reinforce its claim that a transitional process is underway, in line with AU criteria, which require the establishment of a civilian government.
Yet both Burhan and Idris’s efforts have collided with internal dysfunction and governance arrangements beset by military influence, and efforts to form a legislative council have stalled. Even if they had been successful, AU sources tell Mada Masr that they are not inclined to move forward with a reinstatement until the international efforts for a ceasefire bear fruit.
Idris has been making a push to revive contacts with African capitals since October, attempting to build on assurances he had previously received from AU Commission Chair and former Djiboutian Foreign Minister Mahmoud Ali Youssouf and Djiboutian President Ismail Omar Guelleh during their meetings on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in September, according to a former ministerial source. Upon his return from New York, Idris told the press that Sudan’s reinstatement was “a matter of time.”
However, the fall of Fasher undermined whatever upperhand the military once had and Idris found less luck when he met with Guelleh in Djibouti last week.
Kamel Idris meets with Djiboutian President Ismail Omar Guelleh in Djibouti, January 28. Source: Sudan’s Culture Ministry on X.
According to the source and a former Sudanese Foreign Ministry official, the talks were marked by ambiguity, yielding neither definitive answers nor clear timelines. The unclarity, according to the former official, is consistent with the broader regional mood as several African capitals are adopting a wait-and-see approach to Sudan.
For Idris, however, the failure to form a transitional legislative council — which the government views as the final step needed to satisfy AU requirements — has undercut his attempt to demonstrate that Sudan is institutionally ready for reinstatement, according to an informed ministerial source.
When the AU suspended Sudan from all activities in the bloc in October 2021 after the RSF and the military jointly ousted the civilian wing of the government, it linked reinstatement to the restoration of civilian-led transitional authority.
But AU officials signal a different read, emphasizing that setting up transitional bodies alone is insufficient.
A senior official at the AU Commission said that efforts by some states, most notably Djibouti, to support Sudan’s return reflect an awareness of the importance of keeping Sudan within the continental fold. However, the AU, according to the source and another commission official, does not believe that current conditions allow for a decision to lift the suspension, as long as the war remains the dominant feature of the political landscape and in the absence of a complete and credible vision for ending it.
The AU, the sources said, is not satisfied with political signals or cosmetic arrangements, but links any potential return to a comprehensive roadmap that includes a sustainable ceasefire, an inclusive political process and transitional arrangements capable of restoring public trust.
Once tangible progress is made in this direction, the first AU Commission official said, the AU could consider Sudan’s gradual and carefully calibrated return to its institutions.
The second official said that the AU does not require a final resolution to the war at this point, but is instead focused on an agreed-upon vision among the parties to halt the fighting and ease the humanitarian crisis. This would serve as a key indicator, they said, of a genuine shift from the “logic of war to the logic of politics.”
When asked about the US-led Quad ceasefire initiatives, the second official said the platform could help facilitate Sudan’s reinstatement if they succeed in building consensus around a humanitarian ceasefire and an initial political framework. Such progress, the official noted, would strengthen the case for reconsidering Sudan’s suspension.
The AU had twice scheduled an intra-Sudanese dialogue conference — once in early October in Addis Ababa and again in December — both of which were postponed. Party leaders invited to the October AU talks told Mada Masr that the agenda revolved around the roadmap put forward by the Quad in September. The October meeting, an AU source told Mada Masr at the time, was intended to initiate steps toward ending the war and creating a new transitional government to replace Sudan’s parallel governments, aligning with the Quad’s proposal, with invitations extended to both the RSF and the military-led government.
At the time, the AU source said that should efforts to form a unified government fail, the AU was likely to grant Sudan’s seat to the authority better positioned to meet its demands, ruling out the possibility that the RSF would be capable or willing. That assessment, however, predated Fasher’s fall to the RSF.
Inside Sudan, Idris has sought to frame his government as having met all stated requirements for reinstatement, treating the formation of a legislative council as the final procedural hurdle.
However, ticking off the legislative box is not a simple matter.
The informed ministerial source said that political forces within the military-led bloc have continued to wait for direction from Burhan to move the process of forming a legislative council forward. This, the source said, has delayed the presentation of a unified vision that could be successfully promoted externally, making the government appear unable to meet the AU’s formal conditions.
The delay has fuelled Burhan’s anger toward his political allies over the past week.
Things came to a head on January 26, when Burhan convened a meeting with the Democratic Bloc and other allied political forces ahead of his trip to Doha, according to a TSC source. During the meeting, he delivered scathing criticism, dismissing the participants as “bubbles with no real existence,” and describing their performance as “zero,” falling far short of the efforts required at both the governmental and military levels.
The outburst, according to the source, followed Burhan’s mounting frustration over the Sumud alliance’s international campaign. Led by former Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok, the group carried out a European tour in late January, promoting a ceasefire-centered political track. Sumud member Khaled Youssef told the press that the coalition is “advocating for the United Kingdom and the European Union to play a more active role in supporting the truce proposed by the Quad and an adapted humanitarian response to reinforce a political process that will restore the path to a democratic transition.”
A former advisor in Hamdok’s government told Mada Masr that Sumud is preparing a similar African tour, aimed at pressing for tougher African positions against the continuation of the war and opposing Sudan’s return to the AU without a comprehensive political settlement. The campaign, the source said, also seeks to portray Burhan’s authority as being illegitimate and backed by Islamists — which they also emphasized during their European tour.
Speaking from Kalkala in southern Khartoum after Friday prayers, Burhan lashed out at Sumud, saying those who went abroad to “beg,” naming Hamdok and Youssef, would not be allowed to return to the country. He added that some states had been “deceived” by the narratives these figures were presenting.
According to a source close to Burhan, the opposition’s movements angered him, as he believes that his own allied political forces are not contributing to “strengthening the state’s legitimacy.” In the January 26 meeting, Burhan pressed allied forces to take “serious steps,” the TSC source said, and demanded they present a clear vision for forming the legislative council.
The former ministerial source said the Transitional Legislative Council project faces significant organizational and political obstacles, including the absence of a consensual environment, deep mistrust among political forces and the diminished role of key civilian actors in decision-making. These dynamics, the source said, suggest that rather than leading to a genuine transfer of power and forging national consensus, the current transitional phase will entrench military influence within the system of governance and will marginalize civilian political groups.
The February 2025 amendments to the constitutional document, which launched a new transitional period, introduced fundamental changes that were meant to reshape political representation and power arrangements.
The revised text provides for an independent Transitional Legislative Council of up to 300 members, including representation for Juba Peace Agreement signatories, other political forces and social actors. Yet it also stipulates that legislative authority will remain jointly overseen by the TSC and the Cabinet until the council is formed. The selection requires signatories to the the Juba agreement to provide the joint authority with candidates.
Unlike earlier versions of the document introduced prior to the 2021 coup, the amendments set no fixed quotas, effectively suspending earlier arrangements designed to protect the right to political representation.
Sumud spokesperson Bakry al-Jack told Mada Masr that he sees no value in forming a legislative council without elections or consensus, describing what is unfolding as a “pale farce,” no different from the amendments to the constitutional document itself.
The purpose of these steps, he said, is “to send a message abroad suggesting the existence of a civilian government and institutions, when the reality is that Burhan is being installed as an absolute ruler atop the ruins of war.”
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Security and Defense Council gives preliminary approval to Sudan’s return to IGAD
While regional sources say Sudan’s return to the AU is unlikely in the near term, Prime Minister Kamel Idris’s diplomacy and Djiboutian mediation have delivered a procedural step toward Sudan’s reintegration into regional bodies.
A TSC source told Mada Masr that Sudan’s Security and Defense Council gave its preliminary approval to a return to the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) during a meeting on Wednesday, pending final arrangements.
The decision came days after Idris met with IGAD Executive Secretary Workneh Gebeyehu in talks facilitated by Djibouti. The source said Djiboutian officials pressed Idris on the importance of re-engaging IGAD, from which Sudan withdrew two years ago after accusing some member states of supporting the RSF.
Following Idris’s talks with Gebeyehu, IGAD Secretariat said in a statement on January 29 that the bloc “condemns all forms of violations committed [by] the RSF and reaffirms its full support for the unity and sovereignty of the Republic of Sudan, as well as its existing national institutions,” calling on Sudan to return to the organization.
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Foreign minister in Cairo for talks with Egyptian counterpart as humanitarian ceasefire initiatives resurface
Foreign Minister Mohie Eddin Salem met with Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdel Atty in Cairo, February 3. Source: Egyptian Foreign Ministry on Facebook.
Sudan’s Foreign Minister Mohie Eddin Salem met with Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdel Atty in Cairo on Tuesday, as diplomatic activity around a humanitarian ceasefire resurfaced after months of stagnation.
In a statement, the Egyptian Foreign Ministry said the talks addressed bilateral relations and political and diplomatic coordination between the two countries on developments in Sudan.
“[Abdel Atty] stressed the importance of launching an effective humanitarian track” in cooperation with the UN, the AU and relief agencies, according to the statement. He also called for “concerted regional and international efforts to support a comprehensive ceasefire and create the conditions for launching an inclusive political process,” highlighting the role of the US-led Quad mechanism. Abdel Atty also stressed the importance of “coordination and integration between existing regional and international [efforts] aimed at resolving the Sudanese crisis.”
The Cairo talks coincided with remarks by US Senior Advisor for Africa Massad Boulos at a fundraising event for Sudan held at the US Institute of Peace in Washington, where he announced on Tuesday that an initial draft proposal has been developed following extensive consultations with the warring parties, the Quad, the UN and other partners.
“I’m glad to announce our recent important work on developing a proposed mechanism to facilitate demilitarization arrangements, including limited withdrawals and redeployment of forces for specific priority areas as informed by the UN’s independent and impartial analysis of humanitarian needs and response priorities,” he said in a speech during the event.
Boulos said in an interview that the proposal has not been presented to either side yet, adding that the final details would be finalized within the coming days. “Of course, we have informed [the two parties] of the solution’s principle,” he said.
On demilitarization, Boulos said the term he used refers to “withdrawal from some cities for pure humanitarian purposes.” He added that the process would operate through a UN mechanism requiring approval from both sides, noting that the mechanism currently under formulation is the result of consultations with the two parties. “We believe there is preliminary approval from both sides,” he said.
A Sudanese Foreign Ministry source described Boulos’s remarks as purely technical, insisting that any proposal that fails to incorporate the government’s stated conditions would amount to nothing more than “discussion points.”
The source told Mada Masr that consultations over a truce have never stopped, adding that it is too early to talk about draft texts or technical procedures. The government led by Burhan has articulated clear prerequisites for any agreement, including the withdrawal of the RSF from occupied cities to designated assembly points, the facilitation of humanitarian aid and the return of displaced populations, the source said, listing the 2023 Jeddah Agreement-anchored conditions Khartoum has insisted on since the breakdown of earlier ceasefire talks.
As for Egypt’s position, a former Sudanese Foreign Ministry official said Cairo seeks to strike a balance between supporting Sudan’s stability and preserving national ownership of the political process, at a moment when diplomatic initiatives intersect with battlefield realities. Egypt, according to the source, aligns with regional efforts to regulate the regional and international tempo while avoiding infringement on Sudan’s sovereignty or obstructing the path toward restoring the state and stabilizing the country.
In statements issued during Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s visits to Saudi Arabia and Egypt on Tuesday and Wednesday, the parties said discussions included the Sudan crisis. Riyadh, Cairo and Ankara reiterated their support of Sudan’s unity and sovereignty and emphasized the need for a humanitarian truce leading to a ceasefire, the protection of civilians, and delivering humanitarian aid, while stressing the importance of preserving state institutions and launching an intra-Sudanese political process.
But prospects for a breakthrough appear limited. Last week, Sudanese diplomatic sources told Mada Masr that the US and Saudi Arabia have been circulating a humanitarian truce proposal since mid-January that Khartoum had already objected to. A TSC source said the proposed plan seeks to freeze front lines to enable aid delivery, conditional on RSF withdrawal from city centers, but allows the group’s affiliated civil administrations to remain in place — a provision the sources said has drawn objections from the government and the military bloc, who have continued to reject the string of ceasefire proposals put forward since the fall of Fasher in late October.
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Military lifts Kadugli siege
Military Commander-in-Chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan congratulates Kadugli’s residents after the military ended the siege. Omdurman, February 3. Source: Transitional Sovereignty Council on Telegram.
Building on last week’s breakthrough in Dalang, the military announced on Tuesday that it has lifted the siege on Kadugli, the capital of South Kordofan, reopening the Dalang-Kadugli road after heavy fighting with the RSF and its ally, SPLM-N led by Abdel Aziz al-Hilu.
A military source told Mada Masr that the Sudanese Armed Forces and allied forces concentrated their main assault on the 130 km road linking Dalang to Kadugli, dismantling RSF and SPLM-N positions and defenses along the route before reaching the city.
After the siege on Dalang was lifted last week, RSF and SPLM-N forces mobilized troops, vehicles and mercenaries from Heglig, Lagawa, Um Adara and Abu Zabad in West Kordofan in an attempt to halt the military’s advance toward Kadugli, the source said.
Fighting began on Sunday as military forces advanced from Dalang, capturing Dashoul and Kargal, while units moving out from Kadugli took control of Kuweik, according to the source. The heaviest clashes broke out on Monday evening and lasted for around 11 hours, ending with the military seizing Taqato, Barno, Kiga Garro and Hagar Daliba, fully reopening the road to Kadugli.
The source said military and allied forces killed, wounded and captured hundreds of RSF and SPLM-N fighters and destroyed dozens of combat vehicles, while the remaining forces fled toward Abu Zabad in West Kordofan and SPLM-controlled areas in South Kordofan.
Scenes of celebration followed the lifting of the siege, as residents gathered along Kadugli’s outskirts to welcome advancing military units, videos of which circulated widely on social media.
Both Kadugli and Dalang have endured weeks of artillery and drone attacks as RSF and SPLM-N forces attempted to seize control, with supply routes repeatedly cut since the allies laid siege to both cities in October 2023. Conditions deteriorated sharply by the end of June 2025, when the Kadugli-Dalang road was sealed, cutting off all supply chains. In November, the global authority on food security declared famine in Kadugli. Conditions in Dalang were believed to be similarly dire, but a lack of data prevented a classification.
A former military officer told Mada Masr that lifting the sieges on Dalang and Kadugli could open the way for operations against RSF positions in Heglig, Lagawa, Babanusa, Muglad and other parts of West Kordofan.
The advances now allow military forces across South Kordofan to link up, connecting Kadugli’s 14th Infantry Division with the Kalogi and Liri brigades, as well as forces in eastern Kordofan and Abu Gubeiha’s 10th Infantry Division, the former officer said. Further advances north and northwest from Dalang are now possible.
The officer also suggested that forces could push eastward from Kadugli toward the southeastern mountains, particularly Talodi, tightening the siege on the SPLM-N stronghold in Kadawa. Most of the encirclement has already been achieved, stretching from Abu Gubeiha through Dallami, Dalang, Habila, Kuweik, Kiga and into Kadugli, leaving only one remaining route toward Kharasana along the South Kordofan-West Kordofan border, according to the former official.
Despite the breakthrough, civilian casualties continued to mount. The Sudan Doctors Network said 15 people were killed and 11 were injured after drones launched by the RSF and SPLM-N struck the Shartai health center in Kadugli’s Hagar al-Nour neighborhood, as well as another location in the Kashmir neighborhood.
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SPLM-N expands control in southeastern Blue Nile
In Blue Nile State, the SPLM-N said it took control of the areas of Dim Mansour, Bashir Nogo and Khor al-Boudi following heavy fighting with military forces on Tuesday. In a statement, the movement said it seized military combat vehicles and drones during the operation.
A military source told Mada Masr that SPLM-N forces moved from areas along the Ethiopian border and attacked Dim Mansour in the Kurmuk locality and surrounding villages in preparation for a larger offensive on the city of Kurmuk in the far southeast.
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