Cartel of the Suns

The Cartel of the Suns is a term used to describe groups within Venezuela’s armed forces implicated in a wide range of criminal activities, including gasoline smuggling, illegal mining, and other corruption schemes – most notably drug trafficking.

Rather than a hierarchical organization, the Cartel of the Suns functions as a loose network of cells within the army, navy, air force, and Bolivarian National Guard (Guardia Nacional Bolivariana – GNB), spanning from the lowest to the highest ranks. These groups operate essentially as drug trafficking organizations.

It is not clear how these cells relate to one another, or whether they interact at all.

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History

Allegations that GNB soldiers collaborated with drug traffickers date back to the 1990s, when officers were accused of taking bribes to allow traffickers and their shipments to pass.

The phrase “Cartel of the Suns” reportedly emerged in 1993, when two GNB generals – anti-narcotics unit chief Ramón Guillén Dávila and his successor, Orlando Hernández Villegas – were investigated for drug trafficking and related crimes. As brigade commanders, each wore a single sun insignia on their epaulettes, giving rise to the phrase “Cartel of the Sun.” When division commanders – who bore double suns – were later accused of trafficking, the name evolved into the “Cartel of the Suns.”

By the mid-2000s, elements of the GNB and other branches had moved beyond extorting traffickers to directly buying, storing, and distributing cocaine. One theory is that Colombian traffickers began paying Venezuelan officers with drugs instead of cash, forcing them to develop their own markets.

Three major developments contributed to the rise of organized crime in Venezuela during this period. First, Colombia’s multibillion-dollar Plan Colombia, signed with the United States, allowed Colombian forces to intensify operations against guerrilla groups such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – FARC) and the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional – ELN). Increased military pressure pushed the guerrillas to shift their operations into Venezuela’s poorly policed border states. Second, in 2002, the collapse of peace talks between the FARC and Colombian President Andrés Pastrana deprived the rebels of a large safe haven in southern Colombia, forcing them to seek new refuges. Third, the attempted coup that year briefly ousted President Hugo Chávez, diverting his attention to punishing coup supporters and fighting political battles, such as the 2002–2003 oil strike.

The coup’s aftermath led Chávez to narrow his circle of trusted allies, awarding influential posts and lucrative contracts to loyal military officers. The government adopted a praetorian model, with active and retired officers taking senior roles across state institutions. Chávez also created military operational zones along the western border, citing fears of a US invasion from Colombia. Many of these forces were corrupted by the drug trade.

The term “Cartel of the Suns” returned to the public eye in 2004, when journalist and city councilman Mauro Marcano accused senior GNB officials, including intelligence chief Alexis Maneiro, of drug ties. Marcano was murdered later that year. The case suggested systemic corruption within the GNB, but the government made only weak efforts to investigate. No case was opened against Maneiro, who was simply reassigned.

That same year, the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy estimated that about 50 tons of cocaine transited Venezuela. By 2007, the US Government Accountability Office put the figure at roughly 250 tons.

Cases of military involvement in trafficking also drew scrutiny. In 2004, several GNB members planted drugs on three airline passengers, including a US citizen, at Caracas’ international airport. Other GNB officers were arrested in a separate case after being caught loading cocaine onto a private plane at Maiquetía airport (now Simón Bolívar International Airport). These incidents revealed how the military seized shipments when traffickers refused to pay bribes.

In 2005, Chávez accused the US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) of espionage, halting US-backed anti-drug initiatives, including plans to modernize inspection technology at Puerto Cabello, a key port for cocaine exports.

In 2008, the US Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned former military intelligence chief Hugo Carvajal for providing “material assistance” to the FARC’s drug trafficking activities. Carvajal was briefly detained in Aruba at Washington’s request but was quickly released after the Dutch government intervened.

That same year, Chávez pushed through a reform of the Organic Law of the National Armed Forces (Ley Orgánica de la Fuerza Armada Nacional – LOFAN), transforming the National Armed Forces into the Bolivarian National Armed Forces (Fuerza Armada Nacional Bolivariana – FANB). The change was not only symbolic but also reflected a new vision of the military’s role within the state. Under the banners of “civil–military unity” and “integral defense of the nation,” Chavismo redefined military doctrine, seeking to consolidate the armed forces as the backbone of its political project and as guarantors of the Bolivarian Revolution’s continuity.

In 2011, authorities found 1,400 kilograms of cocaine on a plane captured in Falcón state. The aircraft had departed from La Carlota military base in Caracas. Army, air force, and government spokespeople gave contradictory explanations. 

As Nicolás Maduro rose to power following the death of Chávez, the corruption of the state by the drug trade worsened. In 2013, French police seized 1.3 tons of cocaine packed into 31 suitcases on an Air France flight from Caracas, leading to the arrest of 28 people, including a lieutenant colonel and other GNB officers.

More scandals followed. In 2015, Chávez’s former head of presidential security, Leamsy Salazar, accused National Assembly President Diosdado Cabello of being one of the Cartel of the Suns’ leaders. That same year, the United States charged two senior former police officials with drug trafficking. In 2016, US prosecutors indicted Néstor Reverol, Venezuela’s former anti-narcotics chief, and his deputy, Edylberto Molina. The day after the charges became public, President Maduro appointed Reverol as interior minister.

The long list of allegations culminated in March 2020, when the US Justice Department indicted Maduro, senior officials, and FARC leaders on “narco-terrorism” charges, accusing them of corrupting state institutions to facilitate the shipment of tons of cocaine to the United States. The indictment stated that Maduro and others “abused the Venezuelan people and corrupted the legitimate institutions of Venezuela – including parts of the military, intelligence apparatus, legislature, and the judiciary – to facilitate the importation of tons of cocaine into the United States.” At the time, the US State Department offered a reward of $15 million for information leading to Maduro’s arrest.

In August 2025, that reward was raised to $50 million, with the United States first sanctioning the Cartel of the Suns as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGTs) in July 2025 and  then designating it as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) in November 2025. Around the same time, several other countries in the region – including Argentina, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, and Trinidad and Tobago – joined the terrorist designation initiative.

A US military operation in the early hours of January 3, 2026, led to the arrest of Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores, at a safe house in Caracas, who were then brought to New York. 

A superseding indictment unsealed following Maduro’s and Flores’s arrests alleged that the Cartel of the Suns worked with not only the FARC, but also Venezuelan gang Tren de Aragua, Colombian guerrilla group the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional – ELN), and Mexican drug trafficking organizations the Sinaloa Cartel and the Zetas.

Criminal Activities

The Venezuelan military’s most frequent role in drug trafficking has been to guarantee the safe passage of cocaine shipments, as well as to authorize the arrival and departure of aircraft carrying the drug to other countries. Because the armed forces are tasked with protecting national territory and borders and leading the fight against drug trafficking, among other duties, they are uniquely positioned either to detect illicit movements and report them — or to let them pass.

Several reports indicate that Venezuelan military officers stationed along the border can decide whether to allow drug shipments to move by land – and often provide protection along the route. This is especially true of clandestine airstrips in the border states of Zulia, Apure, and Táchira, which serve as departure points for cocaine flights to Central America and the Caribbean.

The Venezuelan military also facilitates the arrival and departure of planes, mainly by manipulating air-defense radar. Case files and reporting reviewed by InSight Crime show that officers often demand payments from traffickers to switch off the radar at precise moments so flights are not recorded, or to issue special codes that make a flight appear legal – ensuring the authorities will not pursue the aircraft later.

Government agents are also involved in authorizing the departure of cargo from official seaports and airports. While there is no conclusive evidence, there are strong indications of their participation. These facilities are generally managed by the military, which keeps them under tight control.

Leadership

The Cartel of the Suns has no defined command structure. Instead, investigators have identified dozens of senior officials across the armed forces linked to trafficking. InSight Crime has documented 123 active and retired high-ranking officers implicated in cocaine smuggling.

Some of the first indications from US government sources of deep involvement by Venezuela’s top security officials in organized crime came in 2008. That September, the US Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned three men allegedly serving as contacts for the FARC in a drugs-for-weapons scheme: Hugo Armando Carvajal Barrios, alias “El Pollo,” then military intelligence chief; Henry de Jesús Rangel Silva, later named general-in-chief and defense minister in January 2012; and Ramón Emilio Rodríguez Chacín, a former interior and justice minister.

In 2011, OFAC sanctioned four more officials for providing weapons and protection to the FARC. Those sanctioned included Cliver Antonio Alcalá Cordones, later named head of the army’s Strategic Integral Defense Region for Guayana (Región Estratégica de Defensa Integral de Guayana – REDI Guayana); Congressman Freddy Alirio Bernal Rosales, a former Caracas mayor and now governor of Táchira state; intelligence agent Ramón Isidro Madriz Moreno; and politician Amílcar Jesús Figueroa Salazar, described as a “principal arms supplier to the FARC and … a main conduit to senior FARC commanders based in Venezuela.”

Supporters of Chávez and Maduro argued the sanctions were based on uncorroborated evidence, including documents seized from the bombed camp of FARC commander “Raúl Reyes.” They dismissed the Cartel of the Suns as a political construct. Still, Venezuelan authorities failed to conduct transparent investigations into Maneiro, Alcalá, and other senior officers, prosecuting only lower-ranking personnel.

Civilian officials have also been implicated. Maduro’s stepsons – Walter, Yosser, and Yoswal Flores – allegedly profited from inflated food import contracts run by Colombian businessman Álex Saab, accused of siphoning millions of dollars from state programs. In 2017, the US Treasury Department sanctioned then-industry minister Tareck El Aissami for playing a “significant role” in drug trafficking, alleging he facilitated shipments for kingpin Walid Makled and offered protection to traffickers Daniel Barrera and Hermágoras González. In 2019, the US Justice Department indicted him for violating sanctions by using US companies to charter private flights.

In 2020, a court in the Southern District of New York indicted Maduro, former General Cliver Alcalá, Hugo Carvajal Barrios, and Diosdado Cabello – now minister of interior, justice, and peace – for participating in cocaine trafficking alongside the FARC.

In June 2023, retired General Cliver Alcalá – who had left the military in 2013 – pleaded guilty in court to collaborating with the FARC since 2006. In 2024, he was sentenced to 21 years in prison for “providing material support to a designated foreign terrorist organization,” including the sale of firearms.

In June 2025, Hugo Carvajal Barrios – military intelligence chief until 2014 and later a member of the National Assembly – also pleaded guilty before the same court. According to a press release from the US Attorney’s Office, Carvajal Barrios “worked with the FARC to coordinate multi-ton drug shipments under his protection; provided heavily-armed security to protect drug shipments; and armed the FARC with automatic weapons and explosives to further the group’s drug trafficking and terrorist activities.” He also used “violence, including kidnappings and murder, to facilitate this cocaine trafficking and protect his co-conspirators.”

Other US government agencies and former Venezuelan officials have also pointed to several powerful figures with ties to the highest levels of government for contributing to criminal activity.

Tareck El Aissami, Venezuela’s former vice president, also stands out for his role in criminal schemes. In 2017, the US Treasury Department sanctioned El Aissami for “his significant role in international narcotics trafficking.” Specifically, Treasury alleged that El Aissami “received payments for facilitating drug shipments by Venezuelan kingpin Walid Makled,” and that he provided “protection to Colombian drug lord Daniel Barrera Barrera and Venezuelan drug trafficker Hermagoras Gonzalez Polanco,” among other crimes.

In 2019, US prosecutors charged him with violating Treasury sanctions by allegedly using US companies to charter private flights.

General Néstor Reverol, former director of the National Anti-Drug Office (Oficina Nacional Antidrogas – ONA), has also been identified as a direct facilitator of drug trafficking operations. A 2015 indictment alleged that between January 2008 and December 2010, Reverol used his position of authority to tip off traffickers about upcoming raids, secure the release of people and property linked to the drug trade, obstruct investigations and counternarcotics operations, and accept bribes from traffickers in exchange for helping them carry out their business.

“Drug trafficking and corruption were commonplace, led by important figures such as Néstor Reverol,” Carvajal Barrios, Venezuela’s former military intelligence chief, told The New York Times in 2019.

Geography

The military elements believed to be most involved in drug trafficking in Venezuela are concentrated along the western border with Colombia, particularly in the states of Apure, Zulia, and Táchira. These cells draw their power from access to the country’s main airports, highway checkpoints, and ports, including Puerto Cabello in Carabobo state.

Cocaine shipments are sourced in the border states of Apure and Zulia or in Colombia’s neighboring departments. Given the shortage of US dollars in Venezuela and the constant devaluation of the local bolívar on the black market, cash transactions are rare. Cocaine is often exchanged for weapons, especially in earlier dealings with the FARC. Otherwise, Venezuelan actors partner with established Colombian traffickers and agree to share profits from overseas sales.

The most commonly used routes are by air to the Dominican Republic and Honduras. Another route involves moving cocaine overland to Suriname and then by air or sea to West Africa, and from there on to Europe. When moved by land, shipments are typically stored on local ranches and farms owned by civilian contacts.

Allies and Enemies

In the past, these military organizations were believed to source cocaine from the former FARC, especially the Eastern Bloc and the Middle Magdalena Bloc. But after the insurgents demobilized in 2016, FARC dissidents who refused to lay down arms inherited part of the business.

Still, the role once played by the now-defunct FARC in supplying shipments and overseeing operations inside Venezuela has, for the past decade, been assumed by the ELN. The guerrilla group has progressively consolidated control along the border and become a strategic partner of the Maduro regime, taking charge of both delivering shipments and protecting drug dispatch zones.

In its 2019 Country Reports on Terrorism, the US government stated that “Maduro and his cronies use criminal activities to help maintain their illegitimate hold on power, which creates a permissive environment for … the ELN.” The guerrillas have reportedly paid members of Venezuela’s armed forces to protect their interests, including illegal mining and gasoline smuggling.

The Bolivarian National Guard also collaborated with civilian drug trafficker Walid Makled to move narcotics shipments out of Venezuela. Makled claimed he worked with dozens of senior army commanders. Both the National Guard and the army allegedly used him as an “intermediary” to coordinate the movement of cocaine shipments abroad.

There is also evidence suggesting that members of the Cartel of the Suns have enjoyed complicity, and even active participation, from senior civilian officials in Venezuela’s government. In 2016, for example, two nephews of Venezuelan first lady Cilia Flores appeared before a US federal court to face drug charges. A DEA agent testified that their planned drug deal was facilitated by Flores’ brother, Bladimir. Evidence presented during the trial suggested the nephews may have acted as a political front for the Cartel of the Suns.

In November 2022, the so-called “narcosobrinos” were released by the United States after serving part of their drug trafficking sentence. Their release was part of a prisoner swap between Washington and Caracas that included the freeing of US citizens held in Venezuela.

Prospects

Multiple cases highlight the involvement of senior officials and members of Venezuela’s armed forces in the criminal activities attributed to the Cartel of the Suns. Yet the Venezuelan government has not launched rigorous investigations or judicial proceedings against the suspects. In some cases, army officers accused of participating in drug trafficking have even been promoted.

Given this situation, and amid Venezuela’s worsening political and economic crises, it is plausible that the Cartel of the Suns will continue operating unhindered and maintain its expansion.

At the same time, record profits from booming coca cultivation and cocaine production in Colombia have turned Venezuela into a strategic platform for drug shipments. This dynamic is sustained by the involvement of military officers at different levels in smuggling and protection networks, as well as by the role of the ELN, which has consolidated territorial control along the border and acts as a key partner in these operations.

The group also faces mounting geopolitical pressure, with the United States describing it as a terrorist organization that threatens US security and arresting Maduro for his alleged involvement in drug trafficking. The Venezuelan government has responded by denying the group’s existence, but it remains to be seen how this pressure and Maduro’s arrest could affect such a deeply entrenched system of corruption.